We explore the determinants of yield differentials between long-term sovereign bonds in the Euro area. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of the international risk factor. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. We present a model that predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and risk, with an interaction term whose magnitude and sign depends on the size of the liquidity differential with respect to the reference country. Upon testing these predictions on daily data, we find that the international risk factor is consistently priced, while liquidity differentials are priced only for a subset of countries and their interaction with the risk factor is crucial to detect their effect.
Introduction
The creation of an integrated market for fixed-income securities in the Euro area is probably the single most important event in world financial markets of the last decade. The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 eliminated currency risk within this area, and standardization of bond conventions by Euro-area sovereign issuers ("reconventioning") made public bonds more easily comparable. As a result, the public debt securities issued by different Euro-area governments should be very close substitutes. Indeed, equally-rated securities should be regarded as perfect substitutes in the market and therefore offer exactly the same yield.
To a large extent, yield spreads on euro-zone government bonds did in fact converge significantly, narrowing from highs in excess of 300 basis points, for certain maturities, to less than 30 basis points across the maturity spectrum over the course of 1997-98. Yet, despite such convergence, euro-zone government bonds are still not perfect substitutes: non-negligible differences in yield levels across countries have remained, to different extents for different issuers and maturities, and they fluctuate over time without a clearly discernible trend. Although by mid-1999, the Bund futures had clearly acquired benchmark status, suggesting that it should have taken on the role of serving other core countries such as France and Austria, yield differentials persisted even between these countries. For some reason even the bonds issued by core countries were not regarded as perfect substitutes of each other, so that for example French bonds traded in the cash market are not considered as a perfect hedge for positions in Bund futures.
What is the reason for these persistent differentials? One possible explanations is persistent risk differences: different sovereign issuers are perceived as featuring different solvency risks, in spite of the provisions of the Stability Pact. Another possible explanation is liquidity. The latter is the explanation that often the financial press gives for these yield differentials. But a simple look at the time-series behavior of Euro-area yield differentials suggests that neither one of these two factors in isolation is likely to provide the full answer.
First, as shown below, the yield differentials relative to the German Bund tend to fluctuate together, much more than measures of liquidity (bid-ask spreads) do. This suggests that liquidity cannot be the full answer, and that there must be another common factor driving the differentials' time-series behavior. But this factor can hardly be the solvency of individual issuers, which is unlikely to change sharply over time and to correlate strongly across issuers. It might instead be the "appetite for risk" of international investors, or -to use more familiar wording -the world price of risk, which can change sharply as a result of changes in the conditional volatility of the world market portfolio or in the risk tolerance of the marginal investor. Even if the default risk of the Italian and French governments relative to the German one were very stable over time, a changing world price for risk could induce the implied yield differentials to correlate over time.
However, this cannot be the full story either. Sizable yield differentials have been observed for several years even within the group of AAA-rated euro-zone countries, even though they have generally narrowed considerably. Still as late as 2002, 10-years AAA-rated Finnish debt yielded on average 20 basis points more than the 10-year German Bund. This suggests that indeed liquidity differences may play a role, as practitioners claim. To the extent that these liquidity differentials interact with the international risk factor mentioned before, they may help explain also the time-series pattern of yield differentials. 1 The first contribution of this paper is to present these ideas in a simple general equilibrium model of bond pricing with liquidity and default risk. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first unified analytical treatment of these issues. In the context of a three-period model, we show how countryspecific default risk and liquidity, interacting with the changing world price of risk, affect the level and time-series behavior of yield differentials. One of the most interesting predictions of the model is that, if a market becomes less liquid, this can either amplify or dampen the effect of increases in the world price of risk. The sign of this interaction term depends on the magnitude of the liquidity difference between the two markets and on that of the world price of risk.
Second, the paper brings these ideas to the data using one year of daily observations on yields and liquidity variables for Euro-area sovereign bonds at the 5-year and 10-year maturities. The results show that a proxy for the world price of risk -the differential between high-risk U.S. corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds at the corresponding maturity -is the single most important explanatory variable for Euro-area yield differentials. Liquidity differentials -as proxied by the difference between the local and the German relevant bid-ask spread -play a role only in a subset of countries. Interestingly, whenever it appears with a statistically significant coefficient, the bid-ask spread tends to increase the corresponding yield relative to that of the benchmark, and its interaction with the world risk factor is negative and precisely estimated. In other words, when an increase in perceived risk induces investors to require an increased yield differential on, say, Belgian bonds, the shadow price that they place on their relative liquidity tends to decrease: the increased risk premium is associated with a reduced illiquidity discount.
This paper adds to a considerable literature on the relationship between returns and liquidity. Many studies argue that illiquid securities provide investors with a higher expected return to compensate them for the larger trading costs they have to bear. The first paper to model and test this relationship is Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . Other studies find a significant cross-sectional association between liquidity (as measured by the tightness of the bid-ask spread or trading volume) and asset returns, controlling for risk: among these, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) , Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998), and Eleswarapu (1997) . A number of studies focus specifically on liquidity effects in fixedincome security markets. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) show that the yield to maturity of treasury notes with six months or less to maturity exceeds the yield to maturity on the more liquid treasury bills. Other studies on U.S. public debt securities by Warga (1992) , Daves and Ehrhardt (1993) , Kamara (1994) and Krishnamurthy (2000) confirm these findings. However, using more recent data Strebulaev (2001) finds that the yield spread between bills and matched notes is much smaller than previously found, especially when bills are on-the-run. Finally, Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2002) investigate the impact of expected liquidity on current securities' prices. They analyze the prices of Treasury securities as their liquidity changes predictably, in the transition from on-the-run to the less liquid off-the-run status, and show that the liquidity premium depends on the expected future liquidity over their remaining lifetime rather than on their current liquidity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and describes the stylised facts that emerge from them. Section 3 lays out the model and its predictions. Section 4 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
The data
The data that we will use in the empirical analysis contains observations on benchmark bonds' prices and liquidity indicators for the Euro area, observed at daily frequencies for the period January 2002-December 2002. The data are collected from the Euro MTS Groups European Benchmark Market trading platform. The data relate to a snapshot of super-best data (those referring to the five most liquid quotes) taken at 11 am CET in all market days for the live Telematico cash markets. For 10-year an expanded dataset, which includes also 2003 data has been recently made available. We shall use the extended sample to assess the robustness of our estimates. The database contains:
(i) the best five bid and ask prices across all markets, (ii) the aggregate quantity of all the outstanding proposals made at the best bid and best ask prices, (iii) the daily trading volume of each bond on the EBM. From this data we calculate redemption yields, maturities and a range of liquidity-related variables described in the Appendix. We concentrate on Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Nertherlands, Portugal and Spain. We do not include Greece and Ireland in the sample, since in 2002 the convergence process to EMU was still ongoing for Greece, while the Euro MTS data for Ireland become available at a very late stage of our sample.
In Figure 1 we show the daily yield differentials between each country in our sample and Germany, which we take as the reference country. For clarity, we report separately the data for Netherlands, France and Austria in the upper panel, and for all the remaining countries in the lower panel of the Figure. Yield differentials have a clear tendency to co-move. The countries shown in the upper panel feature an average yield differential of six basis points while those in the bottom panel have yield differentials that fluctuate around a mean varying from a minimum of sixteen to a maximum of twenty-two basis points. The presence of co-movement is evident both within and between groups. This is confirmed by Table 1 , which reports the correlation between yield differentials over the sample period and presents a principal components analysis. Correlations are very high both within and between groups, and the principal components analysis shows that the first principal component explains above ninety per cent of the variance of the series.
Liquidity indicators do not feature the same pattern as yield differentials. Figure 2 shows, for the same groupings of countries adopted in Figure 1 , the difference in bid-ask spread observed for benchmark bonds relative to German ones. The Figure reports five-days moving averages of the daily observations to smooth volatility. Figure 2 clearly show that liquidity indicators do not share the pattern of yield differentials, neither along the cross-sectional dimension nor along the time-series dimension. This is confirmed by Table  2 , which reports correlations and principal components analysis. The correlation between differentials in liquidity indicators is much lower than that between yields differentials. Moreover, principal components analysis reveals that for liquidity indicators at least six components are needed to explain the same proportion of the total variance explained by the first component in the case of yield differentials.
As argued in the introduction, an international risk factor could contribute significantly to explain yield differentials in Europe. In Figure 3 we display the behaviour of a variable, which often proposed in the literature as an international risk factor: the spread between the yield on 10-year fixed interest rates on swaps and the yield on 10 year US government bonds. There is ample evidence of a common trend in international bond spreads (see, for example, Dungey et al.1997 ). The empirical literature on sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets shows that that the yield of US government bonds, the slope of the US yield curve and risk indicators on the US bond markets, are the main determinants of sovereign spreads (see, for example, Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Barnes and Cline, 1997, and Kamin and Von Kleist, 1999, Arora and Cerisola, 2001). Blanco (2001) and Codogno et al. (2003) use proxies for global credit risk derived from the US yield curve to model euro zone government securities. Interestingly, this international risk factor is strongly correlated with the first principal components from yields differentials in the Euro area. Hence, if liquidity is to have a role in explaining differentials it is likely to be through some interaction with this international risk factor.
The Model
We consider a general equilibrium model with three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, a nonstorable consumption good at each date, and four assets. The consumption good is the numeraire at each date. The period from date 0 to date 1 corresponds to a typical short-term holding period, during which liquidity needs may arise, and the period from date 1 to 2 represents the "long run". The first asset is a safe short-term asset, called S, that pays out a fixed firstperiod (net) interest rate r 0 > 0 and r 1 ≥ 0 from date 1 to 2. We will sometimes refer to holdings of this asset as "cash". The second and third assets, denoted A and B, respectively, are government bonds that are issued (or traded) at date 0, pay out nothing at date 1 and e V i , i = A, B, at date 2. The fourth asset, denoted W , describes alternative world-wide long-term investment opportunities and pays out nothing at date 1 and e V W at date 2. All payouts are in terms of the consumption good of the respective period.
We assume that bond A is safe and let e V A = V almost surely. 2 Although no Western European government bond in the postwar period has ever been defaulted upon, it seems that markets attribute a slight default risk to some bonds. To capture this perception (which may be purely psychological), we assume that e V B is indeed a random variable, with support [0, V ] and a large mass on V . e V W is an arbitrary real-valued random variable. We denote
All assets are traded at dates 0 and 1. We denote date-0 prices by p i 0 , i = S, A, B, W . By assumption, the S-asset trades without frictions. While we ignore trading frictions at date 0 for simplicity, we model these frictions explicitly for date 1 by assuming that market makers set bid prices
and ask prices p i 1 . The t i represent proportional transactions costs in trading that can be due to order processing costs, asymmetric information discounts or other motives discussed in the literature. We take the t i to be exogenous and also assume t W = 0, as we want to focus on the impact of differential transactions costs on government bond trading.
In the spirit of the dynamic CAPM of Lukas (1978), we assume that the four assets are in fixed supply Q i , k = S, A, B, W . This supply is purchased by a continuum of agents of mass 1 at date 0. (asset payoffs are normalized to a per-capita basis). Agents are identical ex ante, all endowed with 1 unit of the numeraire at date 0 and nothing thereafter. Individuals differ ex post, however, because they are exposed to different liquidity needs. To capture this in a simple way, we assume that utility from consuming in t = 1 and t = 2 is given by
with proba π δu(c 2 ) with proba 1 − π where δ ≤ 1 and u satisfies the usual boundary conditions to get interior optima. The Law of Large Numbers holds, such that ex post (at date 1) a fraction of exactly π agents consume. We call agents who must consume at date 1 "impatient" and those who must consume at date 2 "patient".
Analysis
Consider an agent at date 1 who holds a portfolio (y
If the agent is impatient, she sells her portfolio inelastically and consumes
where the last equality has used (1). Note that (p S 1 + r 0 )/p S 0 − 1 is the first-period rate of return on the safe asset (the "safe interest rate" at date 0).
If the agent is patient, she has received r 0 y S 0 as a return on her cash holdings and uses this to buy quantities (y
where
subject to the budget constraint
Here we have used the fact (which can be easily proved formally) that optimally patient agents will not sell the two bonds because of their transactions costs (i.e. that optimally y i 1 ≥ 0 for i = A, B). Using (1) and (3) to eliminate the y S t , final consumption c 2 can be written as
(4) The first term in (4) is the rate of return on the safe asset between dates 0 and 2, the second the two-period excess return on date 0 investments, and the third the one-period excess return on date 1 investments.
The first-order conditions for the patients' problem at date 1 are
for i = A, B, W . At date 0, agents anticipate and take date-1 equilibrium prices as given and maximize πu(c 1 )
, where c 1 and c 2 are given by (2) and (4), respectively, and the y i 1 by the first-order conditions (5) . Using the Envelope Theorem, the date-0 first-order conditions are
Combining (6) and (5) for i = W yields the standard arbitrage relationship p
which simply states that the rates of return of the two frictionless assets between date 0 and 1 must be equal. To close the model, the optimality conditions must be complemented with the market clearing conditions at date 0, y i 0 = Q i and at date 1, πy
for i = S, A, B, W . Inserting these two conditions into the respective budget constraints yields
Finally, we know that in equilibrium total consumption at each date is equal to the total quantity of the consumption good available. Expressed in per-capita terms, this means:
Equations (5), (6), (9) , and (10) are 8 equations in the 8 unknowns p i t , t = 0, 1, i = S, A, B, W . Due to the simple intertemporal structure of the model, this system of equations can be solved fairly easily. In particular, the date-1-problem can be solved independently from the date-0-problem. First, because bond A is riskless, condition (5) for i = A yields the standard riskless no-arbitrage relationship r 1 p
Turning to the remaining three prices (for S, B, W ), (5) and (10) yield the following system of 3 linear equations in 3 unknowns:
Hence, p S 1 is given by Ã (17) into (14) and (15) . Turning to the date-0-problem, we are mainly interested in the relationship between p B 0 (the "generic bond") and p A 0 (the "benchmark bond"). By the multiplicative nature of the pricing kernel, it is more convenient to work with ratios than with differences. 3 Combining the first-order condition at date 0, (6), with that of date 1, (5), we obtain
Dividing through yields
Condition (18) exhibits the two elements that drive a wedge between the valuations of bond A and B very clearly. The first are differences in credit risk, which are expressed by the second fraction. Given our assumptions, this fraction is smaller than 1, thus biasing the price ratio downwards (and the yield ratio upwards). Second, the bonds differ in their liquidity risk, expressed by the t i . If the transactions costs are equal, t A = t B , the first fraction is 1 and there is no difference in liquidity risk. On the other hand, the higher the transactions cost of a bond, the more exposed are its holders to liquidity risk, and the lower is its relative price.
Substituting (17) into (18) and using (11) and (12), yields
In order to interpret (19) practically, we specialize the model to exponential utility and use first-order approximations. That is, we are reducing the analysis to a consumption CAPM-type framework. Using
and denoting c 2 = Ec 2 ,we get
where a > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Similarly, we have
We can use this to evaluate the price ratio (19):
(20) By a similar argument, we have
which allows to approximate the price ratio solely in terms of first and second moments. Empirically, however, the price ratio is less relevant than the yield ratio
The mean-variance approximations derived above therefore suggests the following approximation of the yield ratio:
Using (12) , it is useful to spell out the variance and covariances explicitly:
Interpretation
In the empirical analysis, we will approximate world market investment opportunities by U.S. corporate bond returns. 4 In the context of our model, this implies that asset W is another long-term bond whose face value can be normalized to V . Then (ignoring coupon payments), its yield is given by V/p W 0 . To measure its excess return relative to that of the S asset, as before, it is more appropriate in our model to use ratios instead of differences:
By (7) we have
which, by the date-1 first-order equation (15), is
Using again our linear-quadratic approximation, we have
Empirically, for any of the countries B ∈ {Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain} in our sample, we are mainly interested in how that country's yield ratio (or differential) over Germany, R AB , depends on market liquidity 1−t B , international portfolio volatility σ 2 W , the national correlation with the international portfolio, σ BW , and national credit risk perceptions σ The proposition follows directly from an inspection of (22) and simply states that any increase in risk (in whatever component of the investors' portfolios) will increase the risk premium of the world-wide investment opportunity. The proposition follows directly from differentiating (21). The effect of liquidity on yields is straightforward. If the liquidity of the market for bond B increases (meaning that the bid-ask spread decreases), investors anticipate paying less in case of a future trade of the bond, and therefore demand a lower yield.
The impact of the risk factors σ 
, is unambiguously positive, as increasing risk increases the volatility of consumption and its covariance with the return of the B-bond. The impact of the risk factors on the first term in (21), however, can be negative. All risk factors increase the variance of second period consumption and hence decrease the expected, risk-adjusted, weighted marginal utility from overall consumption (in the nominator and the denominator). If t B ≥ t A , this second-period effect is relatively stronger for the B-bond than for the Abond, which makes the ratio increase. In our data, this is the scenario of the 10 year bond. For that maturity, Germany (bond A) combines the risk-free status with the lowest liquidity costs, mostly thanks to its large issuing volumes and the dominant Bund futures market. Hence, we expect the yield spread over the Bunds to be increasing in the risk factors for each country. For the 5 year bond, however, bid-ask spreads for several countries are not higher than for Germany and sometimes clearly lower. For those bonds, the first term of (21) decreases in the risk factors, and this impact is the stronger the smaller t B (i.e. the better the liquidity of the B-bond compared to the A-bond). If t A is large compared to t B , the consumption effect of the first term can outweigh the risk effect of the second, and an increase in the risk factors can induce a flight into the more liquid market instead of the safer market and thus reduce the yield spread.
The Econometric Evidence
Our econometric evidence is based on the estimation of a simultaneous equation model for yield differentials in the Euro area. In accordance with our theoretical model, we estimate the following eight-equation model:
where the index i varies across countries and the index j varies across maturities (five and ten years). Yield spreads in the Euro area,
are explained by their own lag, to capture persistence in the data, by an international factor,
and by the difference between the residual maturity in benchmark bonds used to form the yield differentials,
We measure the international risk factor as the spread between j-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on j-year US government bonds. We opt for this measure because of its correlation with all US-based measures of risk and because of its availability at different maturities.
We measure the liquidity factor by the bid-ask spread on each bond.
5
Such measure is interacted with the international factor to allow for some non-linearity in their effect. This interaction is consistent with the indications of the theoretical model discussed in the previous sections and it also consistent with the preliminary investigation on the data reported in the previous section. Finally, the differentials in the residual maturity of the benchmark bonds in country i and the benchmark bonds in Germany are included to filter out of the data the effect introduced by the different maturity of benchmark bonds as well as the effect of changes in benchmarks occurring at different dates for different countries in the sample period.
6 5 In fact we have considered a range of altenrative liquidity indicators and selected the bid-ask spread as the most significant measure. 6 We also tried different mehoda of dealing with these problems such as omitting form the sample dates in which benchmar are changed or constructing constant maturity yields.
Our empirical results, reported in Tables 3.1-3 .3, can be summarized as follows:
• At the 5-year maturity only the international risk factor appears with statistically significant coefficients, for Austria, Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands. The sign on the coefficients is positive for all countries, implying that a larger spread between the yield on 10-year swaps and that of the 10-year benchmark US government bonds implies higher yield differentials between all European countries and Germany. The magnitude of this effect varies significantly across countries. The contribution of liquidity indicators to the explanation of yield differentials is not significant.
• At the 10-year maturity, the significance of the international risk factor is strengthened, but liquidity differentials also become significant when the interaction between liquidity indicators and the international factor is considered. In fact, if the coefficient on the interaction is constrained to zero, then also the level of the liquidity indicator becomes insignificant. The international risk factor is significant for all countries except for France and Italy. The magnitude of this effect it significantly higher than in the case of the 5-year yield differentials. The liquidity effect is significant for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. For all these countries a higher bid-ask spread is associated with a higher yield spread relative to Germany. Importantly, in all cases, the positive effect of the bid-ask spread on yield differentials is paired with a significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term between the liquidity measure and the international risk factor. Such evidence clearly illustrates the importance of non-linearities in the effect of liquidity indicators on yield differentials.
• The cross-equations restrictions that would validate panel-type analysis are always rejected. The batteries of tests reported in Tables 3.2 and  3 .3 show that imposing the panel restrictions on the estimated systems for the 5-year and the 10-year maturity does not accommodate the observed degree of cross-country heterogeneity.
We favour the use of the maturity differentials in that it is a natural way of correcting the differentials and it allows a chance toour liquidity indicator in occurrence of episode in which liquidity might highly matter, such as in dates when benchmark are changed.
Our results for the 10-year maturity are robust when the sample is extended to include data from 2003. In fact the precision with which coefficietns are estimated improves considerably. The results, reported in Table  4 .1, shows that the extension of the sample strengthens the significance of the international risk factor, which becomes strongly significant for all countries, including France and Italy. Also, the results on liquidity and on the interaction between liquidity and the international factors are strengthened, although they are still observed only for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. Finally, Table 4 .2 illustrates that, also in this case, Panel restrictions on coefficients are rejected so that indeed SURE estimation is warranted.
Conclusions
This paper aims to explore the determinants of observed yield differentials between long-term sovereign bonds in the Euro area. Daily data for the EMU period show that there is a strong comovement in yield differentials on benchmark bonds relative to the German yield, and that their first principal components explains about ninety per cent of the variance. This common trend appears to be highly correlated with a measure of the international risk factor. In contrast, liquidity differentials -as proxied by bid-ask spread differentials -display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. This suggests that liquidity is unlikely to have a direct and similar impact on yield differentials, while it may have an impact on yield differentials through its interaction with risk.
To generate predictions about the relationships between yield differentials, fundamental risk and liquidity, we present a simple general equilibrium model. The model predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and risk, with an interaction term whose magnitude and sign depends on the size of the liquidity differential with respect to the reference country. We test these predictions on a sample of daily data for the Euroarea sovereign yield differentials in 2002 and 2003. The results illustrate that the international risk factor is consistently priced, especially for high-yield countries and for the longer maturity, while liquidity differentials are priced only for a subset of five countries (out of a total of eight) and their interaction with the risk factor is crucial to detect their effect.
Appendix
The This database contains the super-best prices, i.e. the best bid or ask prices across all markets, the aggregate quantity of all of the outstanding proposals on basis of the best bid and best ask prices, and the daily trading volume of each bond on the EBM.
From these data we calculate redemption yields, maturities and a set of liquidity variables for time series consisting of the benchmark bonds for each country in our sample. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We have constructed the following liquidity variables:
The difference, in basis points, between the 5-day-moving-average of the bid-ask spread of the respective country and the moving average of the German bid-ask spread.
The spread of the trading volume between the benchmark of the respective country and the German benchmark in million of Euros.
Market depth bid: The difference of the ratio of the difference between bid price and mid price and the bid quantity between the country in question and Germany.
Market depth ask: The difference of the ratio of the difference between mid price and ask price and the ask quantity between the country of interest and Germany.
Difference between the maximum quantity available for the respective country and the German benchmark at best prices.
Difference between the minimum quantity available for a country's benchmark and the German benchmark at best prices.
After experimentation, we have selected the bid-ask spread as the most significant liquidity indicator. We have then reported the results of estimation of our-non linear empirical model for this liquidity indicator only. The first row of each cell reports results for the 5-year maturity, while the second row reports results for the 10-year maturity. Standard errors are reported within brackets 
